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Abstract
The Asian crisis and the more recent global economic slowdown changed Vietnam's terms of
trade adversely.  Results from a global macro-model confirm that the consequences were a rural
contraction exacerbated by deflation and consequent slower overall employment and GDP growth.
Further simulations show that a unilateral trade policy reform could return the economy to its growth
benchmark even while export demand remains slack.  Although the short run gains from trade reform
are directionally robust, their magnitude depends on the prevailing macroeconomic policy regime.  If
capital controls are to remain tight, a flexible exchange rate regime is superior to a fixed rate, since it
frees monetary policy to combat deflation.  In this case lost tariff revenue should be made up through
direct taxes to preserve the fiscal deficit.  If capital controls are ineffective, however, the gain in
investment is larger and this changes the monetary and fiscal policy rankings.  A fixed exchange rate
regime is then more effective and an expanded fiscal deficit is growth enhancing in the short run.
* Funding for the research described comes, in part, from the World Bank’s Vietnam Export
Policy Project and, in part, from Australian Research Council Large Grant No. A201.  Thanks are due
to Vo Tri Thanh and Dang Kim Son for very valuable discussions and data resources, to Brett Graham
for research assistance and to Elena Ianchovichina for constructive discussions and comments on
related work for the World Bank.
11. Introduction:
Vietnam is a largely agrarian country in which the current trade policy regime
protects key processing and manufacturing sectors.  High levels of economic growth
were achieved in the decade following the “renovation” reforms of the late 1980s,
which liberalized price-setting, devalued and unified the exchange rate, reduced
subsidies to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and improved private property rights.
Total exports grew rapidly, overall economic growth was maintained at an annual rate
above seven per cent and the proportion of rural households classified as being in
poverty declined (World Bank 1999).  The trade policy regime remained
distortionary, however, favouring capital-intensive manufacturing over other sectors,
including light or labour-intensive manufacturing.  The growth inspired by the
renovation reforms tended to make it easier for the government to continue to direct
new investment to capital-intensive sectors that were largely state-owned.  Yet
Vietnam’s comparative advantage is clearly in labour-intensive manufacturing and
this will be ever more the case as technical change releases Vietnam’s vast rural
labour reserves.
The high growth of the 1990s was achieved, however, in the context of a
decade of sustained economic growth in the industrial countries of the world, led by a
boom in the US.  During 2000, however, the US stock market ceased its expansion
and first the wider US economy, then the world economy, began to slow down.  The
US economy contracted more than a percent through the third quarter of 2001 and its
industrial production contracted more than six per cent (The Economist, December
2001).  This helped to shift the international terms of trade against commodity
exporters like Vietnam.  Moreover, the financial crisis that afflicted several
developing countries in 1997-98 left a number of commodity exporting countries with
substantial debts to service.  In these countries, consumption was squeezed and
exports grew.  US$ commodity prices fell nine per cent in the year to September with
food commodities falling more than four per cent on average and non-food
agricultural commodities falling more than 16 per cent (The Economist, op cit).
Brazil and Thailand were two important cases in point.  They were both
affected by the financial crisis and, collectively, they are key exporters of rice, coffee
and marine products.  The growth in their exports saw declines in the export prices of
2Vietnam’s three most important export commodities.  For rice and coffee, the declines
in export prices are evident in global standard commodity price indices, as shown in
Figure 1.  This adverse terms of trade change stalled Vietnam’s growth and turned the
policy spotlight back on its trade policy regime.  There is little doubt that reductions
in trade distortions will benefit Vietnam’s economy in the long run, in the same way
they have in other East and Southeast Asian economies (World Bank 1993).  In the
short run, however, reductions to import barriers tend to depreciate the real exchange
rate and, depending on the monetary policy regime, there is the risk of domestic
deflation.  This, in turn, tends to raise real wages and to reduce employment growth.
Moreover, tariff reductions reduce government revenue.  If new taxes are not found
increased government borrowing can crowd out private investment, further slowing
growth.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of trade policy reform in
the short run and to focus, in particular, on the role of macroeconomic policy settings
in influencing short run gains from expanded trade.  To do this we use a comparative
static global macroeconomic model, within which the microeconomic (supply) side is
adapted from GTAP1, a multi-region comparative static model in real variables with
price-taking households and all industries comprising identical competitive firms.
Following Yang and Tyers (2000), to this GTAP base is added independent
representations of governments’ fiscal regimes, with both direct and indirect taxation,
as well as separate assets in each region (currency and bonds) and monetary policies
with a range of different alternative targets.  With this model it is possible to conduct
trade liberalization and other experiments under alternative and explicit assumptions
about macroeconomic policy regimes.  Section 2 offers a description of the model
used.  Section 3 applies the model to the recent terms of trade shock and examines its
short-term consequences.  Section 4 then examines the short run effects of unilateral
trade liberalization under a range of alternative macroeconomic policy regimes.  A
short summary and conclusions are offered in Section 5.
2. The Model
                                                     
1 A detailed description of the original model is provided by Hertel (1997).
3The microeconomic side of the model originates with GTAP, which offers
the following useful properties: (1) a capital goods sector in each region to service
investment, (2) explicit savings in each region, combined with open regional capital
accounts that permit savings in one region to finance investment in others, (3)
multiple trading regions, goods and primary factors, (4) product differentiation by
country of origin, (5) empirically based differences in tastes and technology across
regions, (6) non-homothetic preferences, and (7) explicit transportation costs and
indirect taxes on trade, production and consumption.  All individual goods and
services entering final and intermediate demand are constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) blends of home products and imports.  In turn, imports are CES composites of
the products of all regions the content of which depends on regional trading prices.
Savings are pooled globally and investment is then allocated between regions from
the global pool.  Within regions, investment places demands on the domestic capital
goods sector, which is also a CES composite of home-produced goods, services and
imports in the manner of government spending.  The regions, primary factors and
sectors identified in the model are listed in Table 1.  Skill is separated from raw
labour on occupational grounds, with occupations in the “professional” categories of
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) classification included as skilled.2
A key modification of the standard model code makes the government
financially independent, and so enables more explicit treatment of fiscal policy.
Direct taxes are incorporated at the observed average income tax rates for each region.
Marginal tax rates are therefore assumed constant at τ.  Regional households then
receive regional factor income, YF, and from this they pay direct tax τYF,.  The
disposable income that remains is then divided between private consumption and
private saving.  Government saving, or the government surplus, SG = T – G, is then
simply revenue from direct taxes, τYF, and indirect taxes, TI, less government
spending, G, which could be exogenous or fixed as a proportion of GDP.3  Thus, SG =
TI + τYF - G.  The private saving and consumption decision is represented by a
reduced form exponential consumption equation with wealth effects included via the
dependence of consumption (and hence savings) on the interest rate.  Each region then
                                                     
2 See Liu et al. (1998) for the method adopted.
3 TI includes revenue from taxes on production, consumption, factor use and trade, all of which are
accounted for in the original GTAP model and database.
4contributes its total domestic (private plus government) saving, SD=SP + SG, to the
global pool from which investment is derived.4
For each region, the above relations imply the balance of payments identity,
which sets the current account surplus equal to the capital account deficit: X – M = SP
+ SG – I.5  From the pool of global savings, investment is allocated across regions and
it places demands on capital goods sectors in each region.  In the short run considered,
however, it does not add to the installed capital stock.  Also at this length of run,
nominal wages are sticky in some regions (the industrialised regions of the US, the
EU, Canada and Australia, and those developing countries with heavily regulated
labour markets, China and Vietnam) but flexible elsewhere.  In the spirit of
comparative statics, although price levels do change in response to shocks, agents
represented in the model do not expect any continuous inflation and so there is no
distinction between the real and nominal interest rates.
In allocating the global savings pool as investment across regions, we have
opted for the most flexible approach, implying a high level of global “capital”
mobility.6  The allocation to region j depends positively on the expected long run
change in the average rate of return on installed capital, rje, which, in turn, rises when
the marginal product of physical capital is expected to increase.  This allocation falls
when the opportunity cost of financing capital expenditure, the region’s real interest
rate, rj, rises.  This rate depends, in turn, on a global capital market clearing interest
rate, rw, calculated such that global savings equals global investment :Σj SjD = Σj Ij (rje,
rj).  Here Ij is real investment in region j.7  The region’s home interest rate is then rj =
rw(1+πj) where πj is a region-specific interest premium, thought to be driven by risk
factors not incorporated in this analysis.  The investment demand equation for region j
then takes the form:
                                                     
4 Private saving is derived as the difference between disposable income (Y-T) and consumption
expenditure, where real consumption is determined in a Keynesian reduced form equation that takes the
form: [ ]C r Y Tδ µγ= − , where r is the real interest rate.
5 Note that there is no allowance for interregional capital ownership in the starting equilibrium.  At the
outset, therefore, there are no factor service flows and the current account is the same as the balance of
trade.
6 By which it is meant that households can direct their savings to any region in the world without
impediment.  Installed capital, however, remains immobile even between sectors.
7 Before adding to the global pool, savings in each region is deflated using the regional capital goods
price index and then converted into US$ at the initial exchange rate.  The global investment allocation
process then is made in real volume terms.
5where Kj is the (exogenous) base year installed capital stock, β is a positive constant and ε is a
positive elasticity.  Critically, investment in any region responds positively to changes that are
expected to raise the sectoral average of a region’s marginal product of physical capital and
hence the regional average return on installed capital.  Other things equal, then, improvements
in trans-sectoral efficiency, such as might stem from a trade reform, are thought to raise
capital returns permanently and hence they raise rje.  If such a shock also causes the rate of
unemployment to fall this raises total labour use and hence the current return on installed
physical capital.  When the shock is a trade reform, such employment effects are also
considered permanent and so they add positively to the expected future return on installed
capital, rje.
Investment decisions are assumed to be made by forward-looking agents with
access to a long run version of the model.  Thus, the expected change in the (long run) rate of
return on installed capital in each region, rje, is exogenous in short run simulations.  It is
calculated by first simulating the effects of the same shock but under long run closure
assumptions.  These differ from the short run closure in the following ways: 1) there are no
nominal rigidities (no rigidity of nominal wages), 2) larger production and consumption
elasticities are used to reflect the additional time for adjustment, 3) physical capital is no
longer sector specific; it redistributes across sectors to equalise rates of return, 4) capital
controls are ignored, and 5) in Vietnam any loss of government revenue associated with tariff
changes is assumed to be made up via direct (income) tax; so that the ratios of government
revenue and expenditure to GDP are exogenous while the average direct tax rate in Vietnam
is made endogenous.
Note that our short run comparative static analysis does not require that the global
economy be in a steady state.  When shocks are imposed, the counterfactual return on
installed capital, rje, need not be the same as the corresponding opportunity cost of capital
expenditure, rj.  Such shocks, implemented in the current period, change income and savings
and, therefore, expected returns in directions that differ from corresponding short run changes
in the global interest rate, particularly considering that physical capital is fixed in quantity and
sectoral distribution in the short run.  Even in long run simulations, the global distribution of
physical capital at the outset does not equalise rates of return across regions and redistribution
through the regional allocation of one year’s global savings is insufficient to redress such
imbalances.
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6To include the monetary sector in each region we introduce region-specific money
and homogeneous nominal bonds.  Even though there is no interregional ownership of
installed capital in the initial database regional bonds are traded internationally, making it
possible for savers in one region to finance investment in another.8  Cash in advance
constraints cause households to maintain portfolios including both bonds and non-yielding
money and the resulting demand for real money balances has the usual reduced form
dependence on GDP (transactions demand) and the interest rate.  This is equated with the
region’s real money supply, where purchasing power is measured in terms of its GDP
deflator, PY.  Since all domestic transactions are assumed to use the home region’s money,
international transactions require currency exchange.  For this purpose, a single nominal
exchange rate, Ej, is defined for each region.  A single key region is identified (here the US)
relative to whose currency these nominal rates are defined.  For the US, then, E=1 and Ej is
the number of US dollars per unit of region j’s currency.  In essence, we are adding to the real
model one new equation per region (the LM curve linking the real money supply to GDP and
the interest rate) and one new (usually endogenous) variable per region, Ej.9
The bilateral rate between region i and region j is then simply the quotient of the
two exchange rates with the US, Eij = Ei /Ej.  Quotients such as this appear in all international
transactions.  The most straightforward of the international transactions in the original model
are trade transactions.  There the bilateral exchange rate is simply included in all import price
equations, along with cif/fob margins and trade taxes.  In the case of savings and investment,
the global pool of savings is accumulated in US dollars.  Investment, once allocated to region
j, is converted to that region’s currency at the rate Ej (US$ per unit of local currency).  The
third, and most cryptic, set of international transactions in the original model concerns
international transport services.  Payments associated with cif/fob margins are assumed to be
made by the importer in US dollars.  The global transport sector then demands inputs from
each regional economy and these transactions are converted at the appropriate regional rates.
Without nominal rigidities the model always exhibits money neutrality, both at the
regional and global levels.  Firms in the model respond to changes in nominal product, input
and factor prices but a real producer wage is calculated for labour as the quotient of the
nominal wage and the GDP deflator, so that w=W/PY.  Thus, money shocks always maintain
                                                     
8 Since the initial database we use (GTAP Version 5) incorporates no “net income” or factor service
component in its current account, our initial equilibria must do likewise.  This implies the assumption
that, although there are no interregional bond holdings initially, the shocks implemented cause
interregional exchanges of bonds and hence a non-zero net income flow in future current accounts not
represented.
9 More precisely, since for the US E=1, we are adding one less (usually endogenous) variable.  Where
nominal exchange rates are to be endogenous and nominal money supplies exogenous, one additional
variable must be made endogenous.  We could, for example, balance this by making one price level
exogenous, such as by having US monetary policy target the change in the US CPI, PC.
7constant w when nominal rigidities are absent.  It is in the setting of the nominal wage, W, that
we have introduced nominal rigidities to the model.  A parameter, λ∈(0,1) is inserted, such
that 
where W0 is the initial value of the nominal wage, P0Y is the corresponding initial value of the
GDP deflator and Λ is a slack constant.  When ever Λ is exogenous and set a unity, the
nominal wage carries this relationship to the price level and the labour market will not clear
except in the unlikely event that equation (2) happens to yield a market clearing real wage.
The case where the labour market is fully flexible is represented by setting Λ as an
endogenous slack variable and thereby rendering (2) ineffective.  At the same time, labour
demand is forced to equate with exogenous labour supply to reflect the clearing market.
The representation of capital controls:
The model assumes that savings are perfectly mobile between regions
and that the allocation of investment between them depends on region-specific
interest premia and, if they are present, capital controls.  In the absence of capital
controls a region’s domestic capital market might be represented as in Figure 2.  Net
inflows on the capital account (KA), which comprise the net inflow of foreign savings,
SNF, less the net outflow associated with the accumulation of official foreign reserves,
∆R, are perfectly elastic at the global interest rate (the latter being adjusted by the
exogenous region-specific premium, π).10  The actual scale of net inflows depends on
the net demand for foreign investment, NFI=I-SD, where the relationship between NFI
and r is shifted to the right by an increase in the expected future return on installed
capital, re, via equation (1), or by an increase in government spending, G, via its effect
on domestic saving.  It is shifted to the left by an increase in GDP (Y), via its effect on
consumption and tax revenue and hence on domestic savings, SD.  In the figure, net
inflows on the capital account are determined by the intersection of the two curves
shown.  For a balance of payments, these inflows must then equate to net outflows on
                                                     
10 The scope of monetary policy includes alterations in the rate at which official foreign reserves are
accumulated.  When there are no capital controls, however, the perfect capital mobility assumption
implies that changes in reserves have no effect on net capital account flows.  Where they are important
is in the case where capital controls are effective.  Because the manipulation of reserves offers only a
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8the current account, CA, and prices, and therefore real exchange rates, adjust to ensure
that this is the case.  We represent capital controls by a rigid ceiling on net inflows on
the capital account.  The case is illustrated in Figure 3.  In this circumstance the link
between the home and global interest rates is severed unless net foreign investment
falls sufficiently so that the controls cease to bind.  In our simulations the interest
premium, π, is made endogenous while net flows on the capital account, KA, or,
equivalently, on the current account, CA, are set as exogenous.
Data and parameters:
Because the length of run is short, the real part of the short run model
incorporates smaller-than-standard elasticities of substitution in both demand and
supply.  These are set smaller than the standard ones to an extent guided by a short
run calibration exercise on the Asian crisis, described in Yang and Tyers (2000).  For
further details of the model, its parameters and its structure, see Yang and Tyers, op
cit, and Tyers and Yang (2000, 2001).
3. Effects of the terms of trade shock:
The external changes discussed in Section 1, had the obvious effect of
reducing national income and employment growth.  But, for Vietnam, the changes are
more serious because of her special trade structure and her macroeconomic policy.
Rice, coffee and fish products are major exports and they are produced in sectors
employing the bulk of the labor force.  Rice, for example, is grown by nearly 80 per
cent of farmers and more than a tenth is exported.  It is the dominant agricultural
contributor to Vietnam’s exports.  Coffee is the next largest contributor to Vietnam’s
exports and its farmers and processors are almost completely dependent on the export
market.  This means that declines in the export prices of these products have their
most direct effects on rural incomes.  The downturn in key rural product prices risks a
reversal of the recent trend away from rural poverty, an acceleration in the demand for
urban employment and a rise in the costs of urban congestion.
The tendency of Vietnamese monetary authorities to allow only small
variations in the US dollar exchange rate implies that the exchange rate is a major
                                                                                                                                                       
short term approach to exchange rate management that is only available if reserves are sufficient in the
9target for monetary policy.11  A negative external shock like the terms of trade change
results in a real depreciation.  When monetary policy targets the nominal exchange
rate, which then remains fixed or adjusts only partially, the home price level must fall
relative to foreign prices.  Unless foreign inflation is substantial, this requires a
domestic deflation.  There has, indeed, been such a deflation in Vietnam, with the CPI
declining at a rate of between one and two per cent per year since the beginning of
2000.12  Since nominal wages tend to change more sluggishly than other prices,
particularly downward, this raises the trend of real wages and lowers the growth rate
of employment.
The associated fall in the rate of urban employment growth and the rise in
rural to urban migration, taken together, lead to greater unemployment and urban
congestion.  Without a reversal of the terms of trade shock, and one is not expected
soon, the only way steady growth can be restored is through a change of policy that
will restore the rate of growth of export revenue.  The alternatives center on trade
reform, though they range from unilateral tariff reductions through multilateral
reforms of various types, including the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the US
Bilateral Trade Agreement.  We focus on unilateral liberalization, a considerable
amount of which has already taken place in the years since the Asian crisis.
The focus of the simulation is on a short run in which the stock of physical
capital is fixed and sectorally immobile.  Investment makes demands on capital goods
sectors but at this length of run it does not raise the productive capital stock.  Also at
this length of run, nominal wages are sticky downward in some regions (Vietnam,
China, US, EU and Australia) but flexible elsewhere.  For most regions, savings are
mobile internationally and investment is allocated between countries to equate its
expected rate of return net of exogenous risk premia.  In Vietnam and China,
however, capital controls are seen as maintaining constant net flows on the capital
account of the balance of payments irrespective of any change in the global interest
rate.  For each region represented the closure assumptions concerning monetary
                                                                                                                                                       
first place, ∆R is held exogenous throughout the analysis in this paper.
11 This is an interpretation of the macroeconomic data presented by the IMF (2001).  It is not, however,
in precise accord with the interpretation given by the IMF staff in the text of this document.  The
magnitude and distributional significance of the recent terms of trade change (Figure 1 in this paper) is
not examined in that report.
12 See Figure 1, P.27 of IMF (op cit).  The point of disagreement with the interpretation given in the
text of the IMF report is over its preoccupation with controlling inflation when recent external shocks,
combined with monetary policy, have been significantly deflationary.  For supporting evidence of the
deflationary trend, see also Table 1 of Institute of Economics (2001).
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policy, labour market clearance and capital account openness, are detailed in Table 2.
In Vietnam, monetary policy is assumed to target the nominal exchange rate against
the US dollar.  In this one-year length of run, the labour market is not completely
flexible (so that, as in reality, product prices adjust faster than do wages) and the
capital account of the balance of payments is closed.  The simulation results are
summarised in Table 3.
The short run shock represented here is highly stylised.  The global slowdown is
represented only by a 5 per cent fall in the elasticity of consumption to income in the US.
This reduces final demand in the US and its producer price level (GDP deflator) falls.  The
added savings reduce the global interest rate and US investment rises.  There is also an
outflow on the US capital account, however, though Vietnam’s capital controls ensure that
this does not result in an increased inflow there.  The remainder of the terms of trade shock
stems from productivity and consumption shocks in competing exports, particularly Thailand
and Brazil and the associated surges in exports from these economies in the aftermath of the
financial crisis.  To represent this productivity and consumption shocks are administered that
cause the Thai export price of rice to fall 10 per cent and the Brazilian export price of coffee
to fall 20 per cent.  These falls are smaller than those shown in Figure 1 but they represent a
stylised annual change only.  Recall that we are examining short run effects here in a
macroeconomic context.
From Vietnam’s perspective the terms of trade change is adverse, as indicated by the
results presented in Table 3.  It causes a real depreciation.  This is true even though Vietnam
is an exporter of petroleum and the rise in investment around the world associated with lower
interest rates increases expenditure on capital goods, which are energy-intensive.  There is
therefore a rise in Vietnam’s oil export price though one not sufficient in magnitude to offset
the other export price falls.  Given Vietnam’s sticky wages, the deflation raises real wages
and reduces output.  Since the analysis is comparative static, we can think of this result as
implying slower employment growth in a dynamic context.  Aggregate output (GDP) falls (in
a dynamic context it grows more slowly).  To the extent that the terms of trade change is
considered a long term phenomenon, the expected long run change in the average return on
installed capital also falls in Vietnam and this reduces overall investment.
The real depreciation contracts the non-tradeable (mainly services) sectors more than
the others.  The key exceptions to this pattern are the sectors most directly affected by export
price declines: rice, coffee and fisheries.  Coffee and fisheries production contract the most.
Rice production does not contract, despite the fall in its export price.  This is because reduced
overall income bolsters the expenditure share of staple foods and because, in this simulation
at least, a small amount of land is reallocated out of coffee into other agricultural activities,
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including rice and “other crops”.  Although no physical capital is mobile between sectors at
this length of run, unskilled labour does move, as indicated in Table 4.  It migrates from
coffee plantations and services into manufacturing, global demand for the products of which
rises because of Vietnam’s real depreciation.  Manufacturing production therefore rises and
the light-manufacturing sector benefits the most.
Finally, the changes in factor incomes show that, even though there is not a wholesale
contraction in output from the agricultural sector, income to land falls dramatically.  This is
the driving force behind the migration into manufacturing that occurs in the simulation.
Clearly, if this migration is inhibited by Vietnam’s labour registration system and by capital
controls that constrain investment in light manufacturing, the needed expansion of
manufacturing exports would be choked off and employment growth would slow by more
than the small amount shown.  Recent research by Thang (2001) suggests that, while the
mobility of workers between sectors is increasing through time in Vietnam, sufficient barriers
remain.  The above results may therefore err on the optimistic side.
4. The short run effects of unilateral trade liberalization
The 2001 pattern of trade and production taxes and subsidies is constructed first from
the GTAP Version V global database for 1997, adjusted to include the effects of some non-
tariff barriers noted by the CIE (1999).  Recent updates to the tariff regime are as provided by
Thang (2002).  Changes in the associated policy detail are reviewed by the Institute of
Economics (2001).  Of particular importance is the introduction since 1997 of duty drawbacks
that are offered to exporting firms on the component of their imports of intermediate goods
that is used for export production.  The effects of these duty drawbacks are particularly
difficult to quantify since it is generally impossible to separate out production for export from
production for the domestic market.13
For the analysis to be conducted here, the effects of duty drawbacks are approximated
by, first, constructing a database comprising inter-industry financial flows after the general
tariff reforms for the period 1997-2001.  This database emerges from a model simulation in
which the only shocks are the documented changes in tariffs by sector.  The pattern of these
inter-industry flows indicates the magnitude of the expenditures on intermediate inputs and on
import tariffs by firms in each industry and the proportions of their respective outputs that are
exported.  Second, the proportions of expenditures on imported (as distinct from home-
                                                     
13 Bach et al. (1996) offer one approximation that requires the construction of a set of equivalent
production taxes and subsidies and the rebalancing of the economic database to reflect these.
Walmsley et al. (2001) reconstruct their global database to separate out production for exports and
domestic sales.  An investment of this magnitude is too great for the purpose of this report.
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produced) intermediate inputs are derived, along with the average proportions of these that
enter export production.  Expenditures on tariffs for export production follow for each
industry.  Finally, this sum is then returned through the implementation of equivalent export
subsidies (or reduced export taxes).
The application offered here is one in which the manufacturing sector, to which duty
drawbacks primarily apply, is aggregated into only “light manufacturing” and “other
manufacturing”.  At this level of aggregation there is a considerable volume of intra-industry
trade.  To a large extent, manufacturing exports use (mostly light) manufacturing intermediate
inputs that are imported.  In these circumstances, the use of export subsidies to proxy duty
drawbacks is crude but it offers the following realistic consequences:
1) The export industry expands in response to its greater profitability.
2) The price of the industry’s product rises in the home market.  Although this effect is
not realistic in itself, it has the realistic consequence that there is substitution in
favour of imports in intermediate consumption and so the home market share in
intermediate inputs falls.
3) The government is denied the revenue that would have come from the tariffs on
intermediates used for export production, in this case by giving it back in the form of
export subsidies.
The 2001 export tax rates used are modified by to take account of the ad valorem
equivalent export subsidy rates that are proxies for duty drawbacks.  The resulting pattern of
equivalent trade taxes and subsidies is listed in Table 5.  Coffee, “other crops”, processed
food, fishing and manufacturing have received significant border protection, though at rates
that diminished substantially between 1997 and 2001.  Moreover, food processing, which is
the sector through which most agricultural products flow, still receives considerable
protection.  Since, in the Vietnamese input-output table for 1996, on which the inter-industry
flows in the model are based, food processing is primarily rice milling, this protection
advantages the rice sector as a whole.14  Indeed, the rice sector also receives tariff protection
from import competition.  The pattern of protection that advantages agriculture at the expense
of other tradable goods sectors contrasts with that in most other developing countries at
similar levels of income per capita, wherein the agricultural sector is net taxed (Krueger
1992).15
Here the focus is again on the short run. All simulations commence with the Vietnam
economy following the adverse the 1997-2001 reforms and the terms of trade shock discussed
in Section 1.  The further reform examined is a unilateral liberalization of all Vietnam’s
                                                     
14 A great deal of diversification has occurred in the Vietnamese food-processing sector since the mid-
1990s and this characterisation would now be inaccurate.
15 The net effects of the protection regime in the long run are discussed in Tyers (2002).
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import tariffs and export taxes.  Because these reforms are considered here in the short run
only, the sizes of the shocks are reduced to 20%, to represent a realistic change for any given
year.  We seek to estimate the change that would be due to the trade reform alone, taking as
the starting point the Vietnamese economy of 2001, following the terms of trade shock and
the liberalizations of the period 1997-2001.  To assess the role of the macroeconomic policy
environment, however, the liberalization experiment is carried out under eight different policy
combinations that depend on whether (a) monetary policy targets the nominal exchange rate
or the consumer price level, (b) fiscal policy adjusts to reduced tariff revenue by either raising
the deficit or making up the lost revenue through a rise in the income tax rate, and (c) whether
tight capital controls persist or are relaxed.
In the long run, when no nominal rigidities persist and capital can be reallocated
sectorally, this trade liberalization yields the anticipated gains from expanded trade.
Although the trade policy regime of 2001 advantages food processing, agriculture,
fisheries and light manufacturing it is the latter sector that is the robust beneficiary of
unilateral trade liberalisation.  Before turning to the differences wrought by the
alternative macroeconomic policy regimes, it is useful to examine the reasons for
what will prove to be the surprising magnitude and robustness of this result.  It
depends importantly on subtle qualities of Vietnam’s manufacturing sector in reality
and as it is represented in the model.  The first of these is its pattern of factor
intensities.  For all the sectors defined in the model, sets of factor proportions are
displayed in Table 6.  They show, as expected, that agricultural industries are land
intensive, with coffee and “other crops” being more intensive in capital than the other
crops.  Fishing is capital and natural resource intensive and the energy sector is very
capital intensive.  Of special relevance in interpreting the effects of unilateral
liberalisation, however, are the factor intensities for manufacturing.  Note that light
manufacturing is the most labour intensive of all the traded goods sectors while
heavy, or “other”, manufacturing, is, along with transport, the most capital intensive.
The second subtlety is that, when manufacturing is aggregated into two types, as in
this case, the two sub-industries disguise considerable heterogeneity.  One consequence of
this is that there is considerable intra-industry trade.  Light manufacturing is the most export-
oriented of all the sectors - its exports are largest compared with its domestic value added.
Heavy manufacturing, on the other hand, is distinctive by the considerable scale of its
competing imports.  While intra-industry trade is significant in the food-processing sector
nowhere is it more important than in light manufacturing.  This is clear from Table 7.  And
the final subtlety is that a considerable proportion of the intra-industry trade in light
14
manufacturing is in intermediate inputs.  As is evident from Table 8, both manufacturing
sectors commit half their total costs to inputs in the same product category and a third of those
total costs is committed to imported inputs in that category.
Superficially, trade liberalisation removes the sector’s tariff protection and so our
intuition, stemming from the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade model,
suggests it must contract.  But here we have two departures from the (HOS) model.  First, we
have extensive intermediate use from the same sector and, second, competing imports, even
though they are from the same sector, are differentiated from home products.  Under these
conditions the tariff reductions on imported intermediates have a direct effect on home
industry total cost.  Reduced tariffs on competing, but differentiated, imports has only an
indirect effect the magnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution between the
two.  It turns out that the input cost effect of tariff reductions is considerably greater than that
of the loss of protection against competing imports.  There is therefore a considerable
expansion in light manufacturing output and employment.  The resulting rise in labour
demand pushes up the real wage of unskilled workers.  In the short run the tendency for light
manufacturing to expand is further enhanced by the combined effect of nominal wage
stickiness and monetary policy in restraining the real wage rise and hence in raising the level
of employment.  A comparatively labour-intensive sector, light manufacturing attracts this
new labour, bolstering its expansion.
The short run macroeconomics:
The broad behaviour of the model can be represented as in Figure 4.  The upper
diagram represents the domestic capital market and the lower one the domestic market for
foreign products.  These markets are linked by the requirement that, for a balance of
payments, net flows on the capital account must mirror those on the current account.  Net
demand for foreign products (the downward sloping line in the lower diagram, NM=M-X)
depends on the relative price of foreign goods.  For this purpose define the real exchange rate
as
(3) **
Y Y
R
P Pe E PP E
= =
where, as before, E is the nominal exchange rate in foreign currency per unit of home
currency, PY is the GDP deflator and P* is the foreign price level.  In the numerical model we
estimate a real effective exchange rate as the trade-weighted average of the ratio of the home
and the foreign GDP deflators.  Note that this is simply the common currency ratio of the
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home to the foreign product price.  Net imports depend positively on this and negatively on its
inverse – the common-currency foreign to home product price ratio.  This relationship is
shifted to the right by an increase in GDP, Y, or a reduction in protection, τ.  The real
exchange rate is then determined by the balance of payments requirement that net inflows on
the capital account must equal net outflows on the current account, KA=-CA=NM=M-X.16
Consider, first, the case in which tight capital controls are retained.  The trade
liberalisation reduces τ and shifts NM to the right.  With tight capital controls, the current
account balance cannot change.  The shock therefore raises the relative price of foreign goods
in the home market and thus depreciates the real exchange rate.  If the nominal exchange rate
is fixed as the target of monetary policy and the home economy is small by comparison with
its trading partners (as Vietnam is) then, from (3) a fall in PY (a deflation) is required.  This
must be brought about by a monetary contraction in defence of the exchange rate.  To the
extent that wages adjust more sluggishly than product prices, the deflation causes the real
wage to rise.  Were the real depreciation the only consequence of the liberalisation shock its
effects would therefore be contractionary.  Fortunately, this is not the case and, to see it, we
need a multi-product general equilibrium framework like the model used here.  The
liberalisation is seen to improve allocative efficiency to such an extent that GDP rises in spite
of the increased real wage.  In Figure 4 this reinforces the rightward shift in the NM curve and
the resulting real depreciation.  But the increased efficiency also raises the long run return on
installed capital and this raises investment demand, shifting the NFI curve in the upper
diagram to the right.  This rightward shift dominates an opposing one due to higher income
and therefore higher domestic savings.  The effect is a rise in the domestic interest rate
relative to that abroad and a consequent fall in investment.
Now suppose that the monetary policy regime targeted the consumer price level
instead of the nominal exchange rate.  This takes the form of a weighted average of the prices
of home and foreign goods in the domestic market:
*(4) ,C Y PP Av P
E
 =     .
The floating exchange rate then depreciates, raising the home price of foreign goods.  This
necessitates that there be a fall in PY (a deflation), but, this time, it is smaller than before since
adjustment to the real depreciation is shared between the exchange rate and the domestic GDP
deflator (via equation 3).  The consequence of the exchange rate flexibility is a smaller
deflation and hence a smaller real wage increase and a larger net gain from the liberalisation. 
                                                     
16 We ignore the net income component of the current account.
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In the capital market (upper) part of the diagram this means the GDP-driven tendency of the
NFI curve to shift left is larger and the net rightward shift smaller, so that the fall in
investment is reduced.  If it can be managed, therefore, exchange rate flexibility is superior to
a fixed rate regime where capital controls are tight.
If the capital controls are removed, the corresponding liberalisation shock is as
depicted in Figure 5.  Here reduced protection also yields a gain in allocative efficiency and
hence a rise in GDP, reinforcing the rightward shift in the net imports curve.  In this case,
however, the absence of capital controls allows investment to flow in, responding to the
increase in the expected long run return on installed capital.  The increased inflow on the
capital account relaxes the balance of payments constraint in the lower diagram and allows a
substantial increase in net imports.  The relative abundance of foreign goods on the domestic
market rises, so that their relative price falls, and hence the real exchange rate appreciates.
With a real appreciation on the left side of (3), the result is either a nominal appreciation or a
domestic inflation, or both, depending on the target of monetary policy.  If the nominal
exchange rate is fixed, the domestic (PY) inflation is larger.  With sticky nominal wages, this
causes a larger reduction in the real wage and hence a larger expansion in employment and
GDP.  The fixed rate regime therefore gives a better short run outcome when capital controls
are relaxed because then there is a larger (unanticipated) inflation and greater employment
growth.
This general pattern is borne out in the simulation results in Table 9.  With tight
capital controls the gains in GDP and employment are larger when the nominal exchange rate
floats.  Indeed, in the floating rate regime, when monetary policy targets the consumer price
level, PC, the GDP deflator, PY, must fall and so the production real wage still rises, reducing
employment growth.  The superiority of the floating rate regime would have seemed even
stronger had the target of monetary policy been set, instead, at PY.  In sum, then, when capital
controls are weak or nonexistent, the trade liberalisation is seen to attract increased inflows on
the capital account and hence to reverse the effects on the real exchange rate and investment.
Now both rise rather than falling as they did in the presence of tight capital controls.  The
boost to aggregate demand further raises employment and output.17
Fiscal policies:
                                                     
17 The trade reform is a positive shock and so it should not be surprising that an open capital account is
advantageous in its wake.  Such openness would, however, risk outflows following negative shocks
and it is this risk that justifies the controls in the first place.  If the risk of capital flight is to be
minimised, controls on the composition of investment may be required.  These simulation results
simply confirm that such controls should do as little as possible to inhibit the inflow of investment
following positive shocks.
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The fiscal impact of the trade reform comes through the associated decline in tariff
revenue.  Only two alternative fiscal policies are considered.  The first has no tax revenue
switch.  Government spending continues at a constant share of GDP and all rates of direct and
indirect tax are held constant except tariffs, which are reduced by the shock.  The result of the
trade liberalisation is therefore an expanded fiscal deficit.  This is the fiscal policy applying in
the simulations reported in Table 9.  The alternative has the lost revenue made up via an
increase in the direct tax rate, so that the fiscal deficit, government revenue and government
spending are all maintained as constant proportions of GDP.  The two fiscal policy responses
are compared in Table 10.
As with monetary policies, the ranking assigned to the two depends on the strength of
capital controls.  In the presence of tight capital controls (that keep net flows on the capital
account constant) policy 2 outperforms policy 1 in terms of GDP expansion.  This is because
the expanded fiscal deficit under policy 1 adds to the demand side of the domestic capital
market, pushing up the domestic interest rate and crowding out private investment.  Indeed,
the home interest rate rises by more than the expected long run return on installed capital and
so the volume of investment falls.  Under policy 2, the rise in income taxation reduces
pressure on the domestic capital market so that the rise in the home interest rate is less than
that in the expected long run return on installed capital.  The real volume of investment
therefore rises in this case and this adds sufficiently to aggregate demand that GDP expands
by more than under policy 1.
In the absence of effective capital controls the ranking is reversed: policy 1
outperforms policy 2.  This is because net inflows on the capital account are now perfectly
elastic at the international interest rate (plus an exogenous country risk premium).  The added
government borrowing therefore draws in additional saving from abroad and does not crowd
out new private investment in the short run.  Net inflows on the capital account, and domestic
investment, increase substantially, the more so under policy 1.  These new inflows finance
substantially more net imports of foreign goods and therefore cause their domestic price to
fall relative to home goods.  This appreciates the real exchange rate, again by more when
additional government borrowing bolsters the net inflows.  Under the fixed exchange rate
regime, for reasons discussed above, the real appreciation must be matched by a domestic
inflation.  And, while ever wages adjust more slowly than product prices, this reduces real
wages and accelerates employment and GDP growth.
5. Conclusion
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Experiments using a global multi-product comparative static macroeconomic model
indicate that unilateral trade liberalisation not only yields the well known net gains in the long
run but also short run gains are directionally robust to the macroeconomic policy regime.  The
magnitudes of these short run gains are, however, quite sensitive to the particular monetary
and fiscal policies adopted.  When capital controls are tight, a monetary policy that targets the
domestic price level outperforms one that targets the nominal exchange rate.  In this case,
more short run expansion is achieved if lost tariff revenue is made up through an increased
direct tax rate, rather than left to expand the fiscal deficit.  When capital controls are
ineffective, however, the fixed exchange rate regime is superior to a floating one in the short
run, as is the larger fiscal deficit achieved by avoiding any tax switch.
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Figure 1: Trends in world rice and coffee prices
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Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics, Commodity Price Indices (Codes BRI76EBDF,
THI76N.DF)
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Figure 2: The domestic capital market without capital controls
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Table 1:  Model structure
_____________________________________________________________________
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Regions
1. Vietnam
2. Other ASEAN
3. China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan
4. Japan
5. Korea
6. Australia
7. United States
8. European Uniona
9. Rest of World
Primary factors
1. Agricultural land
2. Natural resources
3. Skill
4. Labour
5. Physical capital
Sectorsb
1. Paddy rice
2. Other Coffee (product 8 OCR, “crops nec”)
3. Other crops (wheat, other cereal grains, vegetables, fruits, nuts, oil seeds,
sugar cane and sugar beet, plant based fibres and
forestry)
4. Livestock products (cattle, sheep, goats, horses, wool, silk-worm cocoons,
raw milk, other animal products)
5. Fish (marine products)
6. Energy (coal, oil, gas)
7. Minerals
8. Processed food (meat of cattle, sheep, goats and horses, other meat
products, vegetable oils and fats, dairy products,
processed rice, processed sugar, processed beverages and
tobacco products)
9. Light manufacturing (textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and wood
products)
10. Other manufacturing (paper products and publishing, petroleum and coal
products, chemicals, rubber and plastic products, other
mineral products, ferrous metals, other metals, metal
products, motor vehicles and parts, other transport
equipment, electronic equipment, other machinery and
equipment, other manufactures)
11.  Transport (sea transport, air transport and other transport) 
12. Infrastructure services (electricity, gas manufacturing and distribution,
and water)
13. Construction and dwellings
14. Other services (retail and wholesale trade, communications, insurance,
other financial services, other business services,
recreation, other private services, public administration,
defence, health and education)
____________________________________________________________________
a The European Union of 15.
b These are aggregates of the 57 sector GTAP Version 5 database.
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Table 2: Terms of trade shock short run closurea
China Nominal exchange rate, E Sticky (App 3 λ=0.5)           Rigid
Japan Consumer price level, PC Flexible (App 3 λ=1)           Flexible
Korea Consumer price level, PC Flexible (App 3 λ=1)           Flexible
Australia Consumer price level, PC Rigid (App 3 λ=0)           Flexible
United States Consumer price level, PC Rigid (App 3 λ=0)           Flexible
Europe (EU) Consumer price level, PC Rigid (App 3 λ=0)           Flexible
Rest of World Nominal exchange rate, E Flexible (App 3 λ=1)           Flexible
a  The expected future return on installed capital is exogenous and determined in a separate long run
solution. 
b  The nominal money supply is endogenous in each case, the corresponding exogenous variable being
the listed target.
c  When the nominal wage is assumed flexible it is endogenous and the corresponding exogenous
variable is the employment level.  When it is sticky or rigid, equation 2 of Section 2 is activated and
the employment level is endogenous.
d   Capital controls are assumed to maintain a rigid net inflow of foreign investment on the capital
account.  When KA = I-SD is made exogenous to represent this, an interest premium opens between
the domestic and international capital markets.  This premium becomes endogenous.  Effectively,
the home and foreign capital markets are separated and clear at different interest rates.  Where the
capital account is flexible (open), this implies that private flows on the capital account are permitted
at any level.  KA = I-SD is then endogenous and the home interest premium is exogenous
(unchanged by any shock).  This means that the home interest rate then moves in proportion to the
rate that clears the global savings-investment market.
Region Monetary policy targetb Labour market closure:
nominal wagec
Capital controls: capital
account net inflow I-SD 
d
Vietnam Nominal exchange rate, E Sticky (App 3 λ=0.5)           Rigid
Other
ASEAN
Consumer price level, PC Flexible (App 3 λ=1)           Flexible
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Table 3: Simulated short run effects on Vietnam’s economy of the
negative terms of trade shocka
Form of change Changeb
Nominal exchange rate (US$/•), Ei (%) 0.00
Domestic CPI, PC (%) -0.41
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) -1.17
Nominal Money supply, MS (%) -1.44
Price of capital goods, PK (%) -0.13
Real effective exchange rate, eiR (%) -2.79
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) -1.11
Terms of trade (%) -1.21
Export price of rice (%) -2.00
Export price of coffee (%) -4.15
Export price of energy (%) 3.79
Export price of fish (%) -3.79
Import price index (%) 1.71
Global interest rate, rw -0.73
Investment premium factor, (1+π) (%) 1.02
Home interest rate, r (%) 0.28
Expected (long run) return on capital, re (%) -0.55
Current return on installed capital, rc (%) -2.30
Real domestic investment, I (%) -0.77
Real consumption, C (%) -1.64
Balance of trade, X-M = - KA = -(I-SD) (US$m) 0.00
Real gross sectoral output (%)
Rice 0.14
Coffee -4.74
Other crops 0.57
Livestock 0.29
Food 0.39
Fish -1.01
Minerals -0.04
Energy 0.17
Light manufacturing 1.83
Heavy manufacturing 0.87
Transport 0.47
Infrastructure services -0.41
Construction and dwellings -0.89
Other services -0.49
Real GDP, Y (%) -0.49
Unskilled wage and employment
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W (%) -0.20
Production real wage, w=W/PY (%) 0.98
Employment, LD (%) -1.17
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (%)
 Land        -8.55
 Unskilled Labour (those employed) 0.21
 Skilled Labour       -0.13
 Capital     -1.43
 Natural Resources      2.15
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a  The closure assumptions are as specified in Table 2.
b  The numbers in bold represent exogenous variables.
Source: Model simulation described in the text.
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Table 4: Simulated short run movements of unskilled workers in
response to the negative terms of trade shock
Source: Model simulation
discussed in the text.
Table 5: Equivalent import tariff and export tax rates, 2001a
Import tariff, % Export taxb, %
Rice 15 15
Coffee 1 2
Other crops 6 3
Livestock 3 0
Food 20 1
Fish 22 7
Minerals 2 -3
Energy 2 1
Light manufacturing 20 1
Heavy manufacturing 11 -3
Transport 0 -6
Infrastructure services 0 -3
Construction 0 -1
Other services 0 -1
a  All tariff and tax equivalents are ad valorem.  They are intended to encompass both tariff and non-
tariff barriers, though the accounting for non-tariff barriers is incomplete.
b  Negative export taxes rates indicate export subsidies.  These incorporate the export subsidy
equivalents of the duty drawbacks available on imported inputs by exporting firms, calculated as
explained in the text.
Sources: The 1997 numbers are aggregated from the 57 commodity categories in the GTAP Version 5
global database, 2000.
% Changea
% Change in unskilled
employment
Rice -0.76
Coffee -7.18
Other crops 0.09
Livestock -0.59
Food 0.70
Fish -2.46
Minerals -0.14
Energy 1.83
Light manufacturing 2.78
Heavy manufacturing 1.82
Transport 1.00
Infrastructure services -0.76
Construction and dwellings -3.46
Other services -1.11
Economy-wide -1.17
28
Table 6: Factor intensities by industrya
Land Skilled labour Unskilled
labour
Physical
capital
Natural
resources
Rice 50 0 43 7 0
Coffee 31 5 48 16 0
Other crops 33 0 33 30 4
Livestock 50 0 42 7 0
Food processing 0 9 52 39 0
Fish 0 0 41 20 39
Minerals 0 4 27 30 40
Energy 0 1 9 52 38
Light manufacturing 0 7 63 29 0
Heavy manufacturing 0 8 45 47 0
Transport 0 9 43 48 0
Infrastructure services 0 25 50 25 0
Construction 0 2 25 73 0
Other services 0 29 37 34 0
a  These are factor shares of total value added in each industry, calculated from the 2001 database
following the 1997-2001 trade reforms.
Source: The GTAP Version 5 Database, as modified by simulations described in the text.
Table 7: Trade to value added ratios by industrya
Exports to value added ratio Competing imports to value added ratio
Rice 0.05 0.00
Coffee 1.88 0.27
Other crops 0.19 0.13
Livestock 0.16 0.05
Food processing 1.58 1.76
Fish 0.14 0.01
Minerals 0.29 0.19
Energy 1.25 0.00
Light manufacturing 5.29 2.89
Heavy manufacturing 1.42 9.28
Transport 0.84 0.66
Infrastructure services 0.00 0.00
Construction 0.01 0.00
Other services 0.13 0.14
a  These are quotients of the value of exports or imports at world prices and domestic value added in
each industry.  They are from the 2001 global database (following the trade reforms of 1997-2001).
Source: The GTAP Version 5 Database, as modified by simulations described in the text.
Table 8: Manufactured inputs as shares of the total cost of
productiona
Light mfg inputs as a share of prodn cost Heavy mfg inputs as a share of prodn cost
Total Domestic Imported Total Domestic Imported
Light mfg 49 12 38 17 5 12
Heavy mfg 3 2 2 47 15 32
a  These are input shares of total value added in each industry, calculated from the 2001 database
following the 1997-2001 trade reforms.
Source: The GTAP Version 5 Database, as modified by simulations described in the text.
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Table 9: Simulated short run effects of a unilateral 20% liberalization
of Vietnam’s 2001 trade policy regime regime: monetary policy
Fiscal policy 1: increase deficita
Change in:
Form of
change
Retaining capital
controls, monetary
policy targets Eb
Removing capital
controls, monetary
policy targets E
Retaining capital
controls, monetary
policy targets PC
Removing capital
controls, monetary
policy targets PC
Nominal exchange rate (US$/•), Ei (%) 0.00 0.00 -1.27 1.49
Domestic CPI, PC (%) -1.08 1.10 0.00 0.00
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) -1.70 1.30 -0.75 0.39
Nominal Money supply, MS (%) -1.86 2.08 -0.80 1.09
Export price of rice (%) -2.96 -1.75 -1.78 -3.02
Export price of coffee (%) -0.33 0.34 0.85 -0.97
Export price of energy (%) -0.01 0.22 1.30 -1.25
Export price of fish (%) -0.83 0.70 0.34 -0.55
Import price index (%) 0.00 0.01 1.29 -1.46
Price of capital goods, PK (%) -1.38 1.70 -0.35 0.71
Terms of trade (%) -0.91 -0.33 -1.04 -0.14
Real effective exchange rate, eiR (%) -1.70 1.29 -2.02 1.88
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) -1.70 1.30 -2.01 1.88
Global interest rate, rw 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment premium factor, (1+π) (%) 4.01 0.00 3.78 0.00
Home interest rate, r (%) 4.01 0.00 3.78 0.00
Expected long run return on capital, re (%) 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
Current return on installed capital, rc (%) 1.48 4.70 1.54 4.85
Real domestic investment, I (%) -1.35 2.29 -1.15 2.29
Real consumption, C (%) -0.54 3.68 0.59 2.63
Real private savings, SP (%) 18.98 34.24 20.17 33.78
Real government savings, SG (%) -40.73 -41.93 -39.21 -43.73
Balance of trade, X-M = - KA = -(I-SD) (US$m) 0.00 -286.23 0.00 -305.44
Real gross sectoral output (%)
Rice -0.03 0.18 0.06 0.09
Coffee 0.58 -0.28 0.77 -0.56
Other crops 0.53 0.52 0.66 0.37
Livestock 0.05 1.20 0.11 1.21
Food -0.21 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14
Fish 0.35 0.51 0.46 0.39
Minerals -0.07 1.09 0.12 0.95
Energy 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.04
Light manufacturing 4.05 3.13 4.48 2.58
Heavy manufacturing -0.04 0.11 0.33 -0.30
Transport 0.90 0.74 1.21 0.37
Infrastructure services 0.71 1.76 0.91 1.61
Construction and dwellings -0.29 2.14 -0.16 2.15
Other services 0.59 1.36 0.85 1.12
Real GDP, Y (%) 0.45 1.55 0.64 1.41
Unskilled wage and employment
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W (%) -0.54 0.55 0.00 0.00
Production real wage, w=W/PY (%) 1.18 -0.74 0.76 -0.39
Employment, LD (%) 0.68 3.32 1.11 2.99
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (%)
 Land 3.52 3.54 4.31 2.64
 Unskilled Labour (those employed) 0.54 -0.55 0.00 0.00
 Skilled Labour 0.93 0.45 0.57 0.84
 Physical capital 0.78 4.07 0.77 4.30
 Natural Resources 2.49 1.96 3.14 1.15
a  Fiscal policy 1 has government spending held constant as a share of GDP and the revenue lost from
tariff reform is not made up in other taxes, so the fiscal deficit expands.
b  E is the nominal exchange rate in US$ per unit of local currency.
c  PC is the domestic consumer price level; the CPI.  Note that this is an index of the prices of both
home and imported goods.
Source: Model simulations described in the text.
Table 10: Simulated short run effects of a unilateral 20%
liberalization of  Vietnam’s 2001 trade policy regime: fiscal
policy
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Tight capital controls, monetary policy
targets the nominal exchange rate, E
No capital controls, monetary policy targets
the nominal exchange rate, E 
Change in:
Form of
change
Fiscal Policy 1:
increase deficita
Fiscal Policy 2: tax
mix switchb
Fiscal Policy 1:
increase deficita
Fiscal Policy 2: tax
mix switchb
Nominal exchange rate (US$/•), Ei (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Domestic CPI, PC (%) -1.08 -0.91 1.10 -0.08
Domestic GDP deflator, PY (%) -1.70 -1.47 1.30 -0.32
Nominal Money supply, MS (%) -1.86 -1.35 2.08 0.15
Export price of rice (%) -1.38 -0.94 1.70 0.24
Export price of coffee (%) -2.96 -3.29 -1.75 -2.83
Export price of energy (%) -0.33 -0.47 0.34 -0.22
Export price of fish (%) -0.01 0.01 0.22 0.09
Import price index (%) -0.83 -1.26 0.70 -0.68
Price of capital goods, PK (%) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Terms of trade (%) -0.91 -0.95 -0.33 -0.73
Real effective exchange rate, eiR (%) -1.70 -1.47 1.29 -0.33
Real exchange rate against USA, eijR (%) -1.70 -1.47 1.30 -0.32
Global interest rate, rw 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment premium factor, (1+π) (%) 4.01 1.52 0.00 0.00
Home interest rate, r (%) 4.01 1.52 0.00 0.00
Expected long run return on capital, re (%) 2.50 2.26 2.50 2.26
Current return on installed capital, rc (%) 1.48 1.74 4.70 2.97
Real domestic investment, I (%) -1.35 0.67 2.29 2.07
Real consumption, C (%) -0.54 -1.20 3.68 0.40
Real private savings, SP (%) 18.98 0.45 34.24 5.96
Real government savings, SG (%) -40.73 0.00 -41.93 0.00
Balance of trade, X-M = - KA = -(I-SD) (US$m) 0.00 0.00 -286.23 -109.49
Real gross sectoral output (%)
Rice -0.03 -0.19 0.18 -0.10
Coffee 0.58 0.73 -0.28 0.40
Other crops 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.47
Livestock 0.05 -0.34 1.20 0.10
Food -0.21 -0.35 -0.04 -0.28
Fish 0.35 0.23 0.51 0.29
Minerals -0.07 0.15 1.09 0.60
Energy 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02
Light manufacturing 4.05 4.06 3.13 3.70
Heavy manufacturing -0.04 0.06 0.11 0.12
Transport 0.90 0.86 0.74 0.80
Infrastructure services 0.71 0.43 1.76 0.83
Construction and dwellings -0.29 0.12 2.14 1.05
Other services 0.59 0.37 1.36 0.66
Real GDP, Y (%) 0.45 0.53 1.55 0.95
Unskilled wage and employment
Nominal (unskilled) wage, W (%) -0.54 -0.46 0.55 -0.04
Production real wage, w=W/PY (%) 1.18 1.03 -0.74 0.29
Employment, LD (%) 0.68 0.88 3.32 1.89
Unit factor rewards CPI deflated (%)
 Land 3.52 2.22 3.54 2.22
 Unskilled Labour (those employed) 0.54 0.46 -0.55 0.04
 Skilled Labour 0.93 0.76 0.45 0.57
 Physical capital 0.78 1.24 4.07 2.51
 Natural Resources 2.49 2.25 1.96 2.04
a  Fiscal policy 1 has government spending held constant as a share of GDP and the revenue lost from
tariff reform is not made up in other taxes, so the fiscal deficit expands.
b  Fiscal policy 2 holds government spending constant as a share of GDP but the rate of indirect tax is
allowed to rise so that the fiscal deficit also remains constant as a share of GDP.
Source: Model simulations described in the text.
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